"Perception is Reality" is a statement frequently used to differentiate ones personal view of a situation from another's. On the one hand, we recognize - perhaps, for reasons of peaceful co-existence - our respective views, we also seem to be in an incessant quest for the singular truth. As I have neither established nor want to a priori believe in such a singular truth, I refrain from capitalizing the word "truth" for now.
First of all, I don't foresee truth as a self-contained, comprehensive concept. I see it as composed of several truths, albeit smaller, each of which lend themselves to verifiability and falsifiability.
Verification strengthens a truth; verifiability is a necessary condition for verification. Let me provide an example: I have not travelled to New Zealand. Thus, New Zealand is not a truth that I have yet had a chance to perceive. Until now, its existence is hearsay to me. There do, however, exist people who have been there and have documented objective procedures to get there. More importantly, I can, in principle, undertake the procedures, without a priori believing in the existence of New Zealand and verify that New Zealand, indeed, exists. This can help in my upgrading the truth from hearsay to my own perception.
Falsification disproves a truth. Thus, falsifiability is a very strong test of a truth. "All crows are black" is a truth that offers itself to falsification by the identification of a non-black crow, and I can look for a non-black crow much the same as I look for a black crow.
It is the lack of verifiability and falsifiability that makes me a skeptic with respect to the existence of god, or a supernatural power, or a natural order, or universal consciousness, ... Firstly, one is expected to believe (through a leap of faith) in order to experience. I believe (sic) that one has already conditioned oneself to experience when you executed that leap of faith. Secondly, the procedures to experience the truth are not objective. A non-attainment of the truth experience is attributed to a shortfall in the execution of the procedure, rather than to the possibility that the procedure is erroneous - that is, such truth does not lend iteself to falsification. Thirdly, any attainment of the truth experience is supposedly very personal, and does not lend iteself to a demonstration of the same to others - that is, such truth does not lend itself well to verifiability.
I'd like to emphasize that I consider myself a skeptic and not a non-believer. The difference between the two is as follows: A skeptic is open-minded to different points of view and schools of thought, but has a slight bias against weak truths. A non-believer is pre-disposed to the outcome of the truth test to be negative.
At a high level, a skeptic and a non-believer may be the same - this brings me to the question, "Who carries the burden of the proof?" If I say that it is raining today, I have the burden of the proof to show - by demonstrating that I can get wet if I step outside, or showing raindrops fall from the sky, etc - that it is raining. One can conjure umpteen such examples from our daily lives. It is the existence of something that carries the burden of the proof, not a non-existence.
So, I come back to the question, What is? I answer it as: It is what I can perceive. It is also what somebody else can perceive, and tell me objectively how I may proceed to perceive it. It is also possible that they perceive but are not able to articulate how someone else may perceive it. In which case, what is to them is not what is to me.
Bottom line - there is no universal "it" that is - there are numerous "its" that are, and my "its" need not be the same as yours!
First of all, I don't foresee truth as a self-contained, comprehensive concept. I see it as composed of several truths, albeit smaller, each of which lend themselves to verifiability and falsifiability.
Verification strengthens a truth; verifiability is a necessary condition for verification. Let me provide an example: I have not travelled to New Zealand. Thus, New Zealand is not a truth that I have yet had a chance to perceive. Until now, its existence is hearsay to me. There do, however, exist people who have been there and have documented objective procedures to get there. More importantly, I can, in principle, undertake the procedures, without a priori believing in the existence of New Zealand and verify that New Zealand, indeed, exists. This can help in my upgrading the truth from hearsay to my own perception.
Falsification disproves a truth. Thus, falsifiability is a very strong test of a truth. "All crows are black" is a truth that offers itself to falsification by the identification of a non-black crow, and I can look for a non-black crow much the same as I look for a black crow.
It is the lack of verifiability and falsifiability that makes me a skeptic with respect to the existence of god, or a supernatural power, or a natural order, or universal consciousness, ... Firstly, one is expected to believe (through a leap of faith) in order to experience. I believe (sic) that one has already conditioned oneself to experience when you executed that leap of faith. Secondly, the procedures to experience the truth are not objective. A non-attainment of the truth experience is attributed to a shortfall in the execution of the procedure, rather than to the possibility that the procedure is erroneous - that is, such truth does not lend iteself to falsification. Thirdly, any attainment of the truth experience is supposedly very personal, and does not lend iteself to a demonstration of the same to others - that is, such truth does not lend itself well to verifiability.
I'd like to emphasize that I consider myself a skeptic and not a non-believer. The difference between the two is as follows: A skeptic is open-minded to different points of view and schools of thought, but has a slight bias against weak truths. A non-believer is pre-disposed to the outcome of the truth test to be negative.
At a high level, a skeptic and a non-believer may be the same - this brings me to the question, "Who carries the burden of the proof?" If I say that it is raining today, I have the burden of the proof to show - by demonstrating that I can get wet if I step outside, or showing raindrops fall from the sky, etc - that it is raining. One can conjure umpteen such examples from our daily lives. It is the existence of something that carries the burden of the proof, not a non-existence.
So, I come back to the question, What is? I answer it as: It is what I can perceive. It is also what somebody else can perceive, and tell me objectively how I may proceed to perceive it. It is also possible that they perceive but are not able to articulate how someone else may perceive it. In which case, what is to them is not what is to me.
Bottom line - there is no universal "it" that is - there are numerous "its" that are, and my "its" need not be the same as yours!
No comments:
Post a Comment